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Indigenous educational empowerment is reduced to the maintenance of a traditional
identity because to be educated, according to the coloniser, means that we can no longer
maintain it. Buried within this assumption is the idea that we are incapable of change or
developing strategies for survival that enable us to extend on the multiple subject
positions we have created through kinship and community politics.1
And so we return to the ‘density of our [Indigenous] being’. Once we strip away the
packaging of our commodified [Indigeneity]—the surface, the skin, the viscosity, the
mask—we will discover in our density a more profound complexity, greater clarity and
the potential for emancipation … if we take our density seriously …2
In two recent articles,3 American Indian studies professor Duane Champagne challenges
‘Western’ academic disciplines’ epistemological ability to analyse contemporary Indigeneity.4
Specifically, their failure to consider Indigenous collectivities’ active role in colonial contexts
in terms not readily discernable in Western forms of knowledge means these disciplines miss large
elements of Indigeneity and, as such, fail to offer a plausible basis for its analysis. Cham-
pagne contends that despite its current failure to do so, American Indian studies—extrapolated
here to include all Indigenous studies—should instead assume this mantle by presuming
the distinctive agency of Indigenous peoples, including a focus on exploring our relations
according to our distinctive epistemologies and according to the goals and mandates set
by Indigenous communities. Not only will this distinguish Native studies from the rest of
the academia, it will better position it to assist Indigenous peoples in righting their relation-
ships with dominant, ‘whitestream’ society.5
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I agree with Champagne’s assertion that Indigenous studies—whether within or outside
specific departments and faculties—should exist in contemporary academia and that Indi-
genous communities ought to constitute a central focus to this endeavour. Despite his 
obvious love for the discipline (a fidelity I share), however, his peculiar positioning of Indi-
genous studies as different needlessly marginalises our density and, in doing so, unnecess-
arily gives ground to disciplinary turf long claimed by older disciplines. Thus, although he
usefully positions Indigenous communities as producers of complex knowledge about indi-
geneity, his separation of Indigenous from white society unnecessarily marginalises two
elements of our density critical to this relationship: 1) the extent of Indigenous communi-
ties’ knowledges about whiteness (a social fact which requires an expertise in ‘Western’
concepts); and 2) the extent to which the production of academic knowledge through Indi-
genous studies is shaped by the ‘whitestream’ academic relations of power, marking it in
tension with other forms of knowledge (such as community knowledge). Both are unfor-
tunate omissions. Regarding the first, the epistemological aprioris of whiteness are a domi-
nant representational source through which Western societies produce and consume
Indigeneity. As such, Champagne recklessly jettisons so-called Western disciplinary concepts
and methodologies as immutable precisely where and when they are most necessary. Regard-
ing the second, he dismisses the contextual importance of accounting for the academic
institutional conditions under which native studies units (are allowed to) exist.
My sympathetic critique of Champagne’s argument is divided into three major parts and
a conclusion. Part one extrapolates his analysis of current native studies and his prescrip-
tions for how to fix it. In this context I examine his charge that ‘Western’ disciplines (anthro-
pology, history, sociology and so on) are too epistemologically constricted to properly explain
Indigenous agency or communities and I emphasise his failure to account for the conditions
of possibility under which Native American studies entered into academic history (to borrow
Foucauldian phraseology).6 This latter element challenges the relationships he posits between
both Indigenous studies and other academic disciplines and Indigenous knowledge within
and outside the academy.
Part two unpacks his tropes to reveal an epistemological and ontological essentialism
which positions Indigeneity as separate from (his notion of) colonialism, such that an endoga-
mous focus on the former obviates the need for accounting for the influence of the latter (or
at least, that native studies can analyse the former in a manner which separates it from the
Western academic herd). I argue that Champagne reproduces a variant strain of ‘Aboriginal-
ism’7 that oversimplifies contemporary Indigeneity and overstates the immutability of con-
cepts emanating from existing ‘Western’ disciplines. In doing so, he unnecessarily limits the
contributions Indigenous studies is ideally positioned to make in deconstructing Aboriginalist
discourses and in doing so produces an oddly parochial formulation of the discipline.
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Finally, in part three I offer my own prescriptions for an Indigenous studies anchored in
Indigenous density (rather than difference). The temporal and epistemological complexity
of our relationships with whitestream society means that Indigenous studies must counter
hegemonic representations of Indigeneity which marginalise or altogether ignore our den-
sity. Following in the footsteps of Geonpul scholar Moreton-Robinson’s path-breaking work,
I argue that Indigenous studies’ study of both Indigeneity and whiteness must use all
available epistemologies, not just those which apparently distance Western disciplines from
Indigenous studies analysis.8 While Champagne’s formulation can possibly be stretched to
examine whiteness, the epistemological strategies he proposes for analysing Indigeneity cap-
ture only specific, isolated elements of our complexity. The essay ends with a discussion of
the implications of this argument.
I
Locating (Champagne in) the discipline of native studies
Native studies ‘state of the discipline’ pieces often begin by differentiating our scholarship
from that of longer-standing disciplines.9 Though these are as often prescriptive as reflective
of actual practice, such immanent analysis signals a healthy and growing discipline. American
Indian scholar Clara Sue Kidwell suggests that, at least in native studies, these debates often
play themselves out in a tension between two poles of analysis: essentialism/difference and
adaptation/assimilation.10 She suggests that the essentialism cluster is rooted in an extreme
form of post-colonialism which ‘implies that American Indian ways of thinking existed before
colonialism and remain unknowable by anyone outside those cultures. Native American
studies/American Indian studies can recover the long-suppressed values, epistemologies,
and voices from colonial oppression’.11 Conversely, adaptation clusters typically emphasise
the agency of Indigenous collectivities in the face of whitestream colonialism. Like the essen-
tialism cluster, however, Kidwell argues that in its extreme variant:
the idea of adaptation, or acculturation, or agency represents the ultimate disappearance of
Indian identity into American society. If Indians dress like everyone else, speak like every-
one else, attend public schools, are citizens of the state in which they live and citizens of the
United States, how can they justify claims to a distinctive identity?12
Like others taking the essentialist position in the debate,13 Champagne contends that Indi-
geneity and Indigenous communities are fundamentally different in ways which elide the
epistemological premises of Western disciplines (more on this in part two). These disciplines
employ data collection concepts and practices saturated with a concern for ‘examining the
issues, problems, and conceptualizations that confront American or Western civilization’.14
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Indigenous issues are merely positioned as a specific instance of more general patterns of
minority oppression.15 Such thinking has, he suggests, detracted intellectual energy from
the more laudable Indigenous studies disciplinary goal of ‘conceptuali[s]ing, researching,
and explaining patterns of American Indian individual and collective community choices
and strategies when confronted with relations with the American state and society’.16
Champagne suggests that most native studies departments are multidisciplinary in
character with faculty scattered in numerous disciplines teaching theories and concepts from
numerous academic fields, to students as often as not from non-Aboriginal backgrounds,
with a vague mandate for increasing or generating broader awareness about Indigenous
history and contemporary realities.17 He admits that this multidisciplinarity is often advan-
tageous in that ‘programs could be constructed from long-standing disciplines, and often
seasoned scholars could be called upon to provide guidance and support’.18 However, to the
extent that concepts central to Western disciplines remain ‘oriented toward examining the
issues, problems, and conceptualizations that confront American or Western civilization’,19
these approaches effectively stifle the ability of American Indian studies to produce dis-
ciplinarily endogamous theory and methodology.
The existing Indigenous studies academic landscape is thus, Champagne explains, littered
with disjointed and epistemologically scattered forays into (and about) Indigenous com-
munities. The current inability to produce distinctive theory and method has exacerbated
institutional marginality (his context is American but this is readily extrapolated more
broadly): fiscal conservativism limits the likelihood that even well-meaning administrators
will build-in the solid, permanent funding required for stable Native studies departments
(since money made available for ‘Aboriginal issues’ is just as likely to go to more well-
regarded disciplines such as anthropology, history or education); broader multicultural or
diversity concerns overshadow the distinctiveness of Indigenous experiences by linking them
to broader forms of ‘minority’ oppression (thus the seemingly natural fit of native studies
departments within ‘ethnic studies’ faculties); and mainstream theorising and methodological
thinking has shown a reluctance to ‘think outside the box’ of Western modes of analysis.20
Champagne argues in a nutshell that:
the university bureaucratic environment, weak resource support, the emphasis on race and
ethnic paradigms over an indigenous paradigm, and the relegation of Indian Studies to serve
general diversity interests for the university will continue to constrain, and often will prevent,
full development of indigenous studies departments and programs at many universities.21
Champagne’s understanding of native studies’ relationship to the academy is reminiscent of
the humanism Foucault critiques in his examination of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
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sexuality regulation.22 Foucault takes such explanations to task for their tendency to position
power repressively as an entity which prevents actions and curtails freedoms. Foucauldian
notions of power instead stress its repressive and constitutive character. They emphasise how
discursive power shapes the formation of subjectivities which, in turn, shape the conditions
under which subjects ‘enter into history’. Wedded to a repressive understanding of power,
Champagne makes a homologous correlation between the current academic institutional
marginality of Native studies and the forms of marginality Indigenous communities experience
outside the academy. Thus correlated, he argues that a robust and holistic Indigenous para-
digm can assist in rectifying this repression. For Champagne, then, academic and non-
academic Indigenous knowledge are comrades-in-arms, with Indigenous studies—anchored
in an Indigenous paradigm—providing the missing link.
In this guise, his Indigenous paradigm places Indigenous communities and nations at its
centre, instead of colonial critique. Native studies, Champagne explains, ‘cannot center on a
critique of the colonial experience but rather must focus on the individual and community
choices American Indians make to realize their culture, values, and political and economic
interests within the constraints and opportunities presented by changing colonial contexts’.23
While colonial critique can be useful for examining external forces relating to political, legal
and market conditions, it ‘exclude[s] choice and social action on the part of Native historical
and cultural experience, and in effect American Indians are not analyzed as players in their
own historical contexts but rather viewed as billiard balls knocked around by powerful col-
onial powers and forces’.24 Champagne thus draws a clear distinction between, on the one
hand, what he thinks Western disciplines, with their focus on colonialism, can explain about
indigeneity and on the other, what makes Indigenous peoples truly Indigenous and, pre-
sumably, what these disciplines remain unable to explicate. Perhaps equally importantly, he
assumes that such boundaries are discrete and readily discernable, such that he effectively
erases the object–subject relationship within which all other academic disciplines produce
knowledge.25
Champagne’s ostensible focus on Indigenous communities reflects a central disciplinary
trope of native studies. For example, Cook-Lynn states bluntly that ‘Indian Studies as an
academic discipline was meant to have as it constituencies the native tribal nations of America
and its major purpose the defense of lands and resources and the sovereign right to nation-
to-nation status’.26 This emphasis on tribally specific knowledge is also emphasised by
Muskogee scholar Craig Womack, who argues the need for ‘more attention devoted to
tribally specific concerns’ in a literary context,27 part of a larger ‘literary nationalism’
movement with broadly allied concerns.28 Holm et al. argue even more specifically that native
studies should emphasise the exploration and support of and for what they term ‘peoplehood’,
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positioned to include language, sacred history, territory and ceremony,29 while Kidwell
suggests that native studies should endeavour to emphasise Indigenous relationships with
land, the inclusion of Indigenous intellectual traditions, our inherent sovereignty and the
importance of our Indigenous languages.30
Thus, while Champagne’s focal concerns are not abnormal, his attempt to isolate Indi-
genous communities epistemologically from the broader social fabric of dominant,
whitestream society effectively removes a large part of our arsenal for combatting the damaging
representations of Indigeneity woven into larger society. Parts of his argument turn on the
idea that colonialism exists external to Indigenous communities and nations, as something
we are subject to. Thus, it isn’t that we don’t suffer (from) colonialism; rather, its power resides
outside our communities. From this perspective, theories of colonialism are explanatory
tools but are not enough in-and-of-themselves because their externality precludes their ability
to fully comprehend and analyse our communities’ distinctiveness. In line with the repressive
formulation of power which anchors his understanding of Indigenous studies, for Champagne
colonialism = sameness/assimilation and indigeneity = difference/freedom. I will have more to say
on this below, but suffice it to say for now that his prescriptions become particularly problem-
atic when he attempts to circumscribe the theories and methods native studies should use
in analysis of/with Indigenous communities.
One can perhaps forgive Champagne’s diagnosis in this context, since it represents only
part of his argument and, as I said, is a common trope of Indigenous studies. However,
consider a fuller example of his positioning of colonialism:
Colonial theories emphasize external forces such as political, legal, market, and cultural
constraints and hegemonies to which American Indian communities are subject. Colonial
arguments are powerful tools and explain much change in American Indian communities,
but the kind of change that is explained is externally enforced and often coercive. Such
change is often subtly resisted and not internalized. [footnote omitted] An old Spanish saying
is ‘I bend my knee but not my heart’.31
While his statements might legitimately swell our hearts with pride at the ways our ances-
tors resisted colonialism/oppression while retaining their dignity, traditions and collective
self consciousness, they nonetheless avoid questions about how the cultural power of nation-
states do not merely oppress, but seduce as well.32 Champagne’s essentialism in effect mar-
ginalises the complex ways in which our Indigenous habitus (to borrow from Pierre Bourdieu)
is inevitably and irrevocably constituted in and by the fields of struggle we occupy.33 His
colonialism thus staggers between a vulgar Marxism which stresses an autonomous sub-
ject who can/must reject (or accept) colonialism and an equally vulgar structural-functionalism
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that measures Indigenous agency and collective choices against a Cartesian indigeneity which
exists outside the life and reach of contemporary nation-states’ cultural power.
Champagne thus appears to suggest that we can determine colonialism’s reach by the
extent to which Indigenous individuals act according to colonial values or ‘the influence of
culture and community both past and present’.34 Acting according to the former constitutes
evidence of our subjugation (since to believe otherwise destroys his division between col-
onial and Indigenous-inspired action), while acting according to the latter demonstrates our
freedom from these constraints. And while he acknowledges that Indigenous individuals
and communities must rightfully decide these issues and that their choices may vary based
on how they have transformed intergenerationally,35 this stance hinders rather than helps
his argument since it collapses the very analytical basis of his original division. That is to say,
if, as he suggests, these decisions reside in the communities themselves, surely it is only a
short step to pose similarly fundamental questions about what constitutes a legitimate Indi-
genous community. Champagne’s argument, however, doesn’t allow us to ask such questions:
in fact, he largely presupposes that we already know the answers. His tendency to treat Indi-
genous communities and nations as pre-ordained ‘things’ rather than, like all supposed ‘facts’,
power-laden processes, greatly impoverishes his analysis of the conditions of possibility that
produce collective meaning and, inevitably, the kinds of boundaries which are drawn.
Champagne’s position, though muddled and in parts contradictory, is thus premised on
the notion that concepts central to such ‘Western’ disciplines as anthropology, history and
sociology (to name a few of the usual suspects) cannot ‘offer a holistic approach that centers
American Indian communities and interpretations’ because such disciplines are focused
on understanding American (rather than Indigenous) society.36 The use of concepts like race,
ethnicity or nation thus leaves Western scholars ill-equipped to produce the robust, endog-
amous scholarship required to do justice to the distinctiveness of our Indigeneity or Indi-
genous studies. This is part and parcel of his larger positioning of Indigenous studies according
to a construction of power in which Western concepts repress Indigenous ones and Western
disciplines marginalise Indigenous studies. The primary task of Champagne’s Indigenous
studies, then, is to uncover and remove the conditions of this repression, a task which, in
turn, assists in restoring Indigenous nations to their rightful place in relation to dominant
society. Likewise, the distinctively Indigenous theory, methods and foci used to root out the
conditions of this repression will create a respected niche for Indigenous studies within
the academy.
Examining Champagne’s formulation with a sceptical eye, however, reveals his argument’s
teleological naivety. If we begin with the more complex assumption that power is both
productive and repressive, enabling and constraining, the extent to which Indigenous studies
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can structurally position itself to perform the tasks Champagne asks of it becomes doubtful.
Indigenous studies is subject to the same conditions of possibility that enable and constrain
other academic disciplines, such that important questions arise about the conditions through
which Native studies gains legitimacy as an academic discipline, the kinds of qualifica-
tions Native studies faculty must possess, and the ways in which Indigenous epistemologies
can be pedagogically transmitted in the academy. This is perplexing but not especially sur-
prising given the genealogy Champagne and others attributed to the growth of Native studies
in the academy.
Native American studies programs emerged on 1960’s university campuses as part of
the larger processes of civil rights and anti-war activism. Given the extent to which these
departments and programs entered into a battleground already scarred by centuries of
academic knowledge production about Indigenous peoples, the early years of Indigenous
studies ‘constituted more a response to established paradigms of knowledge than an intel-
lectually coherent statement of Native ways of seeing the world’.37 Indeed, early Indigenous
studies faculty debated the extent to which colonial institutions like the academy, partly
responsible for the latent Orientalism that shaped dominant perceptions of Indigeneity, could
even constitute an effective vehicle for redressing these perceptions. Cook-Lynn suggests
acerbically that ‘academic situations have never been the “ivory towers” they’ve claimed to
be, that they have always had a political agenda, one that has been in serious conflict with
the interests of native populations and Native Studies’.38
Interestingly, Kidwell, Champagne and Cook-Lynn—all progenitors of North American
Native studies—each position Indigenous studies’ rise as hanging from the coat-tails of
broader ‘affirmative action’, diversity and multiculturalism movements.39 Champagne’s
critique of the current state of the Indigenous studies discipline emphasises the troubled
relationship between Indigenous and ethnic studies, referring to the former as ‘the intel-
lectual and policy stepchild of the ethnic studies movement’.40 American Indian inclusion
as part of the larger inclusion of ethnic minorities has become particularly problematic from
a disciplinary standpoint, he argues, because the ethnic studies’ disciplinary models of ‘assimi-
lation, inclusion, or perhaps renationalization’ stand in stark contrast to the Indigenous com-
munity’s stance apart from US society (or at least, who wish to negotiate to dominant American
society on their own cultural terms). For example, Champagne suggests that ‘[o]ften an
Indigenous studies approach has little in common with ethnic studies theory, methods, and
policy, and therefore makes substantive research and teaching in common with ethnic studies
very difficult, and disorienting for students who want to study Indigenous studies approaches’.41
Though I argue in part three that these issues are complex and require an acknowledge-
ment of the deeply complex relations between Indigenous communities and whitestream
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society, in part two I explore the apriori logic which buttresses Champagne’s answer(s) to
these questions. In particular, I demonstrate how his analytical tack produces an emphasis
on Indigenous difference which vastly oversimplifies the complex set of relations within and
through which contemporary Indigenous collectivities and their histories are represented.
II
The analytical povery of Western academia—indigeneity as different
Champagne’s abstraction, imprecision and internal contradictions make it difficult to pro-
duce definitive conclusions about his work. However, Indigeneity-as-different constitutes a
major staple of his argument and even a sympathetic reading requires some agility to avoid
the essentialism which grounds it. My point is this: Champagne’s argument that the ‘con-
tinued emphasis on how race and ethnic identity in mainstream institutions tends to over-
shadow the less well understood perspectives of an Indigenous paradigm grounded in the
cultures, sovereignty, identities, land, and nation building of indigenous peoples’42 loses
its relevance if it fails to include a precise explanation of what the latter terms mean and how
they differ from ‘race’ and ‘ethnic identity’. His repeated failure to delineate them leaves little
analytical purchase to deal with the complexities of being Indigenous in modern, Western
societies, either with respect to how we identify ourselves, how we critique dominant,
whitestream representations or how we employ Western discursive authorities in our daily
struggles. For example, Champagne proposes that ‘[i]mproving existing theories or cat-
egorizations [of Western disciplines] will involve significant revision, and it is doubtful that
existing theories can conceptualize or explain the cultural, land, self-government, and col-
onial histories of Indigenous nations’;43 and further, that ‘most current theories do not
provide powerful enough tools for explaining the Indigenous experience’.44 One of many
questions which arise from such statements, of course, is the extent to which Indigenous
studies—which must necessarily place itself within the same academic relations of power
that shape ‘Western’ disciplines—can under any circumstances cash the kind of cheque
Champagne is writing on its behalf (more on this in part three).
Of more immediate concern: given that Native studies must operate within the forms of
power and associated conditions of possibility that characterise other academic disciplines,
what allows it to step outside in ways the other disciplines cannot? For Champagne, it is our
valorisation of Indigenous epistemologies. Given the centrality of his criticism of Western con-
cepts, his positioning of their central terms deserves to be quoted in their full length, pre-
cisely because they explicate the conceptual bases from which he launches his critique of
Western disciplines:
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race: ‘Race and critical race theories focus on marginalization of socially conceived racial
groups and provide critiques of dominant group methods of oppression and control … the
focus of race and critical race theories tends to assume achievement of equality and inclu-
sion into US society as a primary goal. Such goals of social equality are taken up by some
American Indians, but race and critical race theories do not conceptualize or center collective
American Indian goals such as preservation of land, self-government, and reclaiming
culture’;45
class: ‘while helpful, class theory provides little conceptual or explanatory power for under-
standing American Indian emphases on reclaiming culture and collective tribal forms of
economic organization’;46
ethnicity: ‘Theories of ethnicity focus on group organization and culture but do not include
issues such as collective land retention and institutions of self-government’;47
nation: ‘ “Nation” is a term often used in Indian country today partly because the expression
makes sense in English and in American culture for a political grouping, but its meaning
may have powerful cultural meanings for many American Indian communities that are
not implied in the English expression’;48
post-modernism/post-colonialism: ‘are imbued with the deep social epistemologies of Western
society. There is much emphasis on marginalization, generally in materialistic forms, and
on emancipation and liberation from oppression. Such arguments make sense given the
economic and colonial conditions under which indigenous peoples often live, but the goals
of the theories should not be imputed to be the goals and values of many indigenous peoples
and communities’.49
Given the apparent inadequacy of these concepts in Champagne’s argument and his stated
focus on Indigenous communities and nations, what is he left with in his pursuit of an
academic basis for Indigenous studies? His looming but largely unacknowledged essential-
ism leaves him—as essentialism usually does—with an emphasis on Indigenous difference.
Champagne repeatedly stresses elements which supposedly render Indigenous communities
and cultures different from settler society and its communities: for example, our collective
forms of governance, collective land retention and institutions of self government, the 
centrality of non-human powers and the importance of balance between human and non-
human powers, all sit outside the ability of Western disciplines to analyse.50 Thus, the
epistemological (and, one assumes, ontological) commitment of concepts of race, class, eth-
nicity, nation and culture to Western society—to assimilation or renationalisation—pre-
cludes the ‘deep cultural or institutional perspective of American Indians or center American
Indian history or individual, group, or cultural experiences’.51 They fail, for example, to
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‘emphasize ways of life that seek spiritual or moral balance with the human and non-
human forces of the world’.52 Perhaps equally importantly, (Champagne’s) American Indian
communities are, he tells us, likely to find such concepts troubling insofar as they rely on
‘epistemological assumptions usually alien to those made in American Indian communi-
ties and traditions’.53
Few Native studies practitioners would quarrel with Champagne’s argument that Indi-
genous communities differ in fundamental ways from dominant, whitestream society. This
acknowledgement, however, is accompanied by two rubs. First, in the specific context of
the academy, in his failure to explain specifically why Indigenous studies as a discipline should
hold a privileged place in the academy to render pronouncements regarding the authenticity
of this difference. Second and relatedly, Champagne unproblematically conflates community
Indigeneity with its academic manifestation and in doing so reproduces the very same episte-
mological power of whiteness (at the heart of all academic disciplines) he critiques in his
original formulation. What epistemological distances exist between academic and community
knowledge? Where can we place Native studies in this continuum? Champagne doesn’t
answer these questions because for him, the latter question is, in an ideal world, a solution
to the former: Native studies is Indigenous knowledge in the academy.
Champagne’s failure to account for the constitutive character of power which shapes
‘academic Indigeneity’ pushes his argument unnecessarily and uncomfortably close to an
‘Aboriginalist’ logic which locates Indigeneity by precisely what, apparently, it is not: white/
capitalist/secular/modern. Certainly, his intentions differ from those of colonial adminis-
trators who sought to destroy our distinctiveness, disregard our complexity and produce
representations which apparently reaffirm(ed) their superiority over us. Nonetheless, his
essentialism effectively marginalises ‘dynamic, kinetic, and unfolding [Indigenous] voice[s]’54
at a time when many (including Champagne himself) have laboured so intensively to
interrogate and denaturalise such static representations. Perhaps equally importantly, his
analytical lens remains focused solely in the direction of Indigenous communities and in so
doing handcuffs our ability to undertake an immanent deconstruction of Indigenous rep-
resentations produced in and by white society.
Champagne’s argument is clearly dedicated to clearing intellectual space for an Indigenous
studies willing to do the heavy lifting involved in exploring and analysing what ‘the Western
gaze rarely acknowledges’ (see below) by using distinctive theoretical and methodological
tools apparently unavailable to Western disciplines. We might, then, merely (if generously)
read Champagne’s argument as advocating that a proper study of contemporary Indigeneity
requires both Indigenous and Western epistemologies. This strand of his argument, though
abruptly anti-essentialist and almost wholly at odds with his earlier discussion, appears
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reasonably to suggest that Indigenous communities are not so different after all, and certainly
allows him to avoid his articles’ more essentialist moments.
However, this move paints Champagne into another, equally tricky corner. If Indigenous
communities are not essentially different, on what epistemological basis can Indigenous
studies stake a theoretical or methodological claim separate from those of other disciplines?
With all due respect to Champagne, we can no longer base such a claim around an ability to
ask questions about Indigeneity in ways Western disciplines cannot, since that ship sailed
when he cracked open his positioning of Indigeneity to all epistemological comers. Like-
wise, he has a larger problem which, perhaps ironically, stems from this same stated centring
of Indigenous communities. Though in placing our communities front and centre he right-
fully positions us as knowledgeable, agentic subjects, his argument narrows this knowledge
to what we know about ourselves and presents no sustained analysis of our equally import-
ant knowledge about whiteness. This latter task requires expertise in the very ‘Western’ dis-
ciplinary concepts he dismisses. In doing so, Champagne places us outside of the regimes
of power which accord these concepts their currency. In a phrase, Champagne has valorised
our difference at the expense of our density. The third and final part of the paper will address
these issues.
III
Indigenous studies as interrogating whiteness: an appeal for density
In the paper’s previous section I argued that Champagne’s argument relies on a humanist
conception of power to spot-weld together an uncharitable and undertheorised analysis of
‘Western’ concepts with an unfortunate and dated emphasis on Indigenous difference. Roughly
hewn as it is, his argument nonetheless eludes easy analysis since its lesser strands appear
to recognise the contingency of Indigeneity/difference in relation to its interaction with
settler society. Still, his stressing of our difference marginalises the extent to which Indi-
genous peoples and our communities—central to his configuration of Native studies—are
knowers not just of Indigeneity, but of whiteness as well. In this way—Champagne’s criticisms
notwithstanding—Indigenous studies’ location in the very same regimes of power as ‘Western’
academia requires that its practitioners avail ourselves of the symbolic power of, and launch
part of our critique using, a vast array of knowledges, virtually all of which he dismisses.55
This complexity is a central element of our collective density, a term I explain with more
specificity next.
In an elegant analysis of a conceptual artist’s series of drawings dedicated to what he terms
the ‘the continual dissipation of dense black being’,56 the noted African American studies
scholar Robin Kelley remarks that:
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The drawing is a close-up or cross section of struggle—not just political struggle but the
struggles of everyday life. Their gestures range across the gamut: fighting, dancing, begging,
cajoling, teaching, thinking, loving. And these are the human gestures that tend to lie beneath
the surface of our dense black being, the sources of our creativity and desire that the
Western gaze rarely acknowledges.57
Kelley’s conception of density allows him to step outside the Orientalist discourses which
comprise and circumscribe (American) blackness—‘the desire that the Western gaze rarely
acknowledges’. This density is constituted through the numerous subject positions which
blackness occupies in its modernity. It harkens to a blackness which eclipses staid tropes
to come to terms with a more serious and infinitely less schematic livedness which defies easy
(academic) description. This more recent thinking echoes his earlier, celebrated text on black
authenticity in the US, where Kelley suggested that 1970s social scientists reduced black-
ness to ghetto culture, which in turn was ordered according to more or less tacit social dis-
organisation theses which perceived it either as a manifestation of individual pathologies
(drugs or sexualised behaviour) or as a reaction to and means of enduring poverty and
racism.58 Like blackness, Indigeneity is far more complex than revealed through a discussion
of our difference.
Certainly, dangers exist in qualifying Indigenous experiences in terms of the forms of
oppression impacting other racialised entities, like African-Americans. Indeed, Champagne’s
point is precisely that Western disciplines’ failure to understand Indigeneity results in part
from the fact that they position Indigeneity as though it were merely a specific instance of
more general sets of structural imperatives (whether ethnic, racial or national). Nonetheless,
whitestream representations of blackness operate along epistemological and ontological taxo-
nomies familiar to those ordering Indigeneity, making my comparison a danger worth
risking. Like blackness, Indigeneity is often (still) positioned in opposition to white/colonial
identity along a series of binary oppositions which labour to reaffirm the supposed superiority
of the latter over the apparent primitiveness of the former. And like blackness, Indigenous
complexity has been reductively fixed in time and space through apparently objective,
logical markers used to bear the discursive weight of our authenticity and legitimacy.59
According to Geonpul scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson, these images and representations
hold in common a marked similarity within a larger, colonially inscribed regime of white-
ness.60 She posits the ‘unnamedness’ of whiteness as a means through which dominant rep-
resentations of Indigeneity are positioned as authentic, objective and ‘true’ at the expense of
Indigenous knowledge production, either about ourselves or about others. In colonial nation-
states, such fundamentally partial normativity is nonetheless positioned as a natural and uni-
versal entity through which whites are positioned as ‘knowing subjects’ about—and in
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juxtaposition to—Indigenous people. This universality is (unconsciously) invested in by
whites, and in its guise ‘racial superiority becomes part of one’s ontology … and informs the
white subject’s knowledge production’.61 This presumptive superiority anchors and shapes
white recognition of the normative, social and legal boundaries of class, race, gender, and,
ultimately, citizenship.
Two related elements of Moreton-Robinson’s argument about the unacknowledged 
power of whiteness are of particular salience in problematising Champagne’s formulation of
Indigenous studies. First is her notion that Indigenous peoples are situated as objects rather
than subjects or ‘knowers’ of knowledge about Indigeneity or whiteness. Since, as Moreton-
Robinson notes, whiteness was universalised to represent humanity as a whole, it produced
with it divisions regarding not only how valid knowledge is produced but who can produce
it. Second, she argues that the looming overdetermination of whiteness circumscribes even
well-meaning attempts to come to grips with it, such that Indigenous intellectuals are
often positioned as outside the existing disciplinary regime which produces white academics.
This limits the ways in which we can engage in critique as Indigenous scholars. Traces of each
of these logics are present in Champagne’s formulation of Indigeneity and Indigenous studies
and these would, I argue, unnecessarily limit its place in academia.
Regarding situating ‘Indigenous peoples as knowers’, Champagne’s argument takes us part
of the way. As Indigenous people we are likely to know things about our Indigeneity which
sit outside the ability of Western disciplines to discover or analyse with proper complexity
(though my use of ‘we’ is obviously complicated). Couched in a fairly straightforward stand-
point epistemology, Champagne thus maintains that Indigenous studies should earn its dis-
ciplinary stripes by making this ontosociological point the centerpiece of its theoretical and
methodological trajectories. I think he is wrong to assume that Indigenous studies can under-
take this task in ways precluded by the epistemological limitations of ‘Western’ disciplines,
but his heart is in the right place, so to speak. However, his emphasis on the distinctiveness
of Indigenous knowledge doesn’t go far enough in that he doesn’t consider the ways in which
Indigenous knowledge about whiteness can be used to ‘disrupt its claims to normativity and
universality’.62
Moreton-Robinson’s point is precisely that as Indigenous peoples we are well aware of and
deeply steeped in knowledge about whiteness—how it operates, what it takes for granted
and the gaps, silences and illogicalities of its presumptive truths. She argues that despite the
fact that the ‘knowledges we have developed are often dismissed as being implausible,
subjective and lacking in epistemological integrity … colonial experiences have meant
that Indigenous people have been among the nation’s most conscientious students of white-
ness and racialisation’.63 Fiona Nicoll argues similarly that the ‘fact that it is possible for
Indigenous and/or non-white people to know [whites] demonstrates that epistemologies do
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exist outside the scopic regimes of Western modernity’.64 Although critiquing whiteness
according to Indigenous epistemologies accords with the general logic of Champagne’s
argument, he spends little time pointing his analytical lens in that direction. Both Moreton-
Robinson and Nicoll flesh out the implications of this argument to demonstrate that
Indigenous studies cannot be solely concerned with ‘focusing on the continuity of land,
community, self-government, and culture, present[ing] a new and alternative way to under-
stand social groups’ if those social groups are only ‘indigenous peoples, and their struggles
in the contemporary context of nation-states’.65
Thus, teaching about whiteness, how whiteness frames Indigeneity and how Indigenous
people know whiteness should stand as a central component of the discipline of Indigenous
studies. In offering Indigenous studies the option of focusing on Indigenous communities or
on a critique of colonial society, Champagne thus offers us a false choice. A sophisticated
Indigenous studies discipline must focus on Indigenous communities as a critique of colonial
society. Champagne’s separation of Indigenous and colonial, assimilation and difference,
oppression and freedom, does little to contextualise the conditions of possibility within which
Indigenous academics are allowed to be both Indigenous and academic (let alone the com-
plicated issues which arise from non-Indigenous academics doing Indigenous studies scholar-
ship). And, by intimating that Western concepts stand in contrast to Indigeneity, he denies
Indigenous studies academics the level playing field so crucial to our launching of critiques.
Moreton-Robinson thus hits the nail on the head when, in challenging a review of one
of her books, she questions the reviewer’s criticism of her use of conventional academic
rhetoric as appearing to argue that ‘Aborigines only speak with a colloquial flavour and, 
by implication, when we use conventional and or academic language we become less
Aboriginal’.66 Torres Strait Islander scholar Martin Nakata argues similarly that the ‘issue 
for Indigenous scholars is one of how to speak back to the knowledges that have formed
around what is perceived to be the Indigenous positions in the Western “order of things” ’.67
It makes no sense to argue, as Champagne does, that terms like ethnicity, race, nation or
post-modernism are doomed by their institutional genealogies. Not only should Indigenous
studies practitioners and students understand such terms and their impact on the study of
Indigenous communities, these terms and the social relations encapsulated in them com-
prise an important part of the density of contemporary Indigeneity. They are part of what makes
us Indigenous. Writing off these concepts as less useful than other (unnamed) concepts, as
Champagne does, is the analytical equivalent of burying our heads in the sand. Aprioris don’t
simply evaporate when we fail to problematise them; rather, they niggle their way further
into the foundations of discursive representations, insulating themselves from critique. This
is the power of whiteness. Although Champagne appears to presume that we can step out-
side its power, it doesn’t necessarily make it so.
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Conclusion
By way of conclusion, let me offer some thoughts on where my removal of difference—a cen-
tral pillar of Champagne’s Native studies—leaves us with respect to fashioning a discipline
which can honour our past complexity while accounting for its contemporary and future
manifestations.68 Champagne spends much of his analytical time arguing that Western con-
cepts and disciplines are of only limited use to Indigenous studies because they fail to account
for the distinctive needs, aspirations and epistemologies of Indigenous communities. A proper
Indigenous studies discipline must thus produce:
points of view and conceptualizations drawing on the everyday strategies and conceptions
of American Indian communities that require mainstream academics and policy makers 
to rethink and extend the views of indigenous groups, as a means to include their views 
and socio-cultural actions outside the use of class, ethnicity, race, and even nationality. 
Native American Studies, and more generally indigenous studies, calls for conceptualiz-
ations and strategies that encompass issues, rights, and strategies of political, cultural, and
territorial survival.69
He thus positions Native studies (a position familiar to Native studies practitioners) as a dog
on the leash for Indigenous communities and nations. Such a position offers little in the way 
of analysis about the complexity of academic/community relations but it certainly feels good
to say. He doesn’t appear to realise the extent to which analysing such a relationship 
necessarily requires sliding into disciplinary territory long claimed by other disciplines. If
his point is that as Indigenous studies practitioners we need to claim this territory as our
own, I am in full agreement. My point is merely that staking such a claim requires none of
the epistemological baggage he wants to pack for the journey, and indeed raises troubling
issues that require us to carefully unpack what he proposes to bring. Two of these are worth
unpacking here.
First, the community/academic relationship which appears to anchor Champagne’s
formulation is problematic in that it ignores the ways that whiteness in the academy shapes
the boundaries of its knowledge production in ways which do not necessarily subscribe to
the regimes under which community knowledges are produced: Moreton-Robinson con-
tends quite rightly that such representations ‘may not reflect the same knowledges about
authenticity that are created and deployed within and by Indigenous communities and as
such they may not be acceptable’.70 In ignoring this complexity, how on earth is Champagne
to deal with the conflicts that inevitably arise? It does little good to acquiesce to one 
discourse or the other (though more often than not academic representations are given the
nod), nor can we pretend that such differences are always reconcilable. These conflicts 
95CHRIS  ANDERSEN—CRITICAL INDIGENOUS STUDIES
—
arise in situations pertaining to fundamentally irreconcilable positions on precisely the
relationships between humans and nature (as Champagne points to) but they can also
arise in more mundane situations, such as how to provide honorariums for elders involved
in research projects in ways which don’t claw back from their monthly social assistance
cheques.
Second, even (or especially) if Indigenous studies is a dog on the leash for Indigenous
communities and nations, why does this necessarily require an entirely new set of theoreti-
cal or methodological precepts that differ from those of mainstream disciplines? I agree with
the broad strokes of Champagne’s argument about constructing a specific niche for ourselves
in the academic, as do many other Native studies practitioners. But many of us have been
involved in situations in which an Indigenous community has approached our department
to ask for research assistance for mundane issues about collecting data on telephone or
internet use in their community; proper application of census documents to produce the
robust statistical profiles through which they interface with government funders; water purity
samples to make determinations of water safety; or even archival documents to assist them
in legal battles over hunting, fishing and other resource extraction questions. Although the
disciplines of sociology, biological sciences, history or anthropology could and have
undertaken this assistance, so can many existing Indigenous studies departments. It seems
inherently strange to call for a theoretical and methodological orientation—and thus, according
to Champagne, a discipline—which possessed none of this capability. His model presupposes
the difference of Indigenous communities and in doing so slams the shutters closed on forms
of expertise which might nonetheless prove of central concern to the communities.
Champagne contends that ‘the issues confronting indigenous peoples are not reducible
to race, class, ethnicity or other common analytical dimensions in use within mainstream
disciplines’.71 The problem, from an epistemological standpoint, is that no issues of any
peoples can be reduced to these factors. Concepts—all concepts—are by definition schematic
and as such are laughably simplistic in the face of the enormous complexity of human life.
This complexity requires us to acknowledge that Indigenous communities are—and have
been for centuries—more than the ‘holistic, institutionally nondifferentiated’ entities in which
‘knowledge is inherently integrated with community, culture, and political and economic
relations’72 painted by Champagne. Thus, although not fully captured by terms like race,
ethnicity or class, such terms nonetheless assist greatly in reflecting upon the relationships
between our communities and the various nation-states, and not only because they possess
symbolic power in dominant society.
The real irony of Champagne’s model of Indigenous studies is that his choices of analytical
focus require none of the theoretical or methodological prescriptions he begs of them. For
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example, his most prominent critique of Indigenous studies—that a ‘cacophony’ of theoreti-
cal and methodological tools will ‘doom’ it to institutional marginality73—is usually emphasised
as a disciplinary strength. Thus, Indigenous studies scholar Jace Weaver writes that:
in dealing with the totalizing systems that we know as Native cultures, each view from
traditional disciplines is limited and partial, NAS must draw together the various disciplines
and their methods in order to achieve something approaching a complete picture of Natives,
their cultures and experiences.74
This isn’t an issue for Champagne, apparently, since his positioning of Indigenous com-
munities strips them of any of the epistemological complexity that would require us to intrude
on others’ disciplinary turf. He sees this as his model’s strength but in fact it becomes its
Achilles heel. By beginning with the assumption that Indigenous communities are epistemo-
logically dense (rather than just different), however, Weaver’s appeal for interdisciplinarity
becomes vital. Indeed, failure to account, interdisciplinarily, for this density elevates the
danger of producing a naive, substantialist and ultimately parochial Indigenous studies.
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